This is a more recent paper to the ABA one identified in the post below, which has the advantage of also being an analytical / critical piece. To be clear, I do not necessarily support or condone the criticisms set out in the paper – but I do like how his analysis makes one think about what antitrust should be about. The article can be found at http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol53/iss2/4/.
While mainly focused on the US, the paper is interesting for its (critical) description of how our current understanding of antitrust as being mainly devoted to promoting consumer welfare and efficiency came about (interesting tidbit: before 1975, the US Supreme Court had never mentioned “consumer welfare” in an antitrust case); and of how this “official” understanding conflicts with the proliferation of antitrust goals to be found in laws across the world (which leads to a useful review of such antitrust goals, mainly relying on ICN work).
The critical part is also interesting for its consideration of how the dominant paradigm of competition law is still rather open-ended. In particular, the paper examines: (i) several difficulties with promoting consumer welfare as the primary goal of antitrust, including disagreements over the meaning of consumer welfare and how to quantify it; and (ii) the difficulties in measuring different types of efficiencies, and the problems associated with applying enhancing efficiency as antitrust’s primary goal. This discussion is particularly interesting as regards innovation / dynamic efficiencies, even though that section relies quite a bit on OECD work.