Jens Prufer and Christoph Schottmüller ‘Competition with Big Data’ CentER Discussion Paper 2017-007

This working paper – which can be found here – attempts “to better understand data-driven markets: i.e. markets where the cost of quality production is decreasing in the amount of machine-generated data about user preferences or characteristics (henceforth: user information), which is an inseparable by-product of using services offered in such markets”. The authors start from the assumption that data-driven markets are characterized by imperfect competition and subject to indirect network effects. In the light of this, they try to determine: (a) under which conditions a duopoly can be a stable market structure in a data-driven market; (b) when the propensity to market tipping (i.e. to monopolization) becomes overpowering; (c) the conditions that allow a dominant company in one data-driven market to leverage its position into another market. The paper begins, at least implicitly, by distinguishing between indirect network effects (which mix supply and demand effects. They occur where increased demand leads to decreasing costs in obtaining a product input – in…

David Evans ‘THE EMERGING HIGH-COURT JURISPRUDENCE ON THE ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF MULTISIDED PLATFORMS’

This paper – available here – reviews various court decisions adopted between September 2014 and 2016 that apply competition law to matters involving multisided markets. The paper is short, and the structure is quite simple: after summarizing the key differences between multisided markets (the author insists in calling them matchmakers) and traditional businesses, it reviews the aforementioned court decisions. The article is quite short, and provides a succinct overview of these cases and their implications for antitrust analysis of matters involving multisided platforms. These include three decisions regarding payment cards, including the US Court of Appeals decision on American Express  and the European Court’s decisions in Groupement des Cartes Bancaires and MasterCard; the GoogleMaps decision by the Cour d’Appel de Paris; and the Telcent decision by China’s Supreme People’s Court. The conclusion is that all these decisions recognize that platforms serve multiple interdependent groups of customers, and that the interactions between these groups matter for the substantive analysis of antitrust…