Ariel Ezrachi ‘The Ripple Effects of Online Marketplace Bans’ (2017) World Competition 40(1) 47

This paper – which you can find here – assesses the economic and legal implications of online marketplace bans in order to determine what treatment they should be subject to under competition law. The discussion opens in Chapter 2 with a review of different types of online marketplaces. Online marketplaces bring together large numbers of sellers and buyers, and in doing so facilitate dynamic competition, both in relation to greater inter-brand competition and in relation to intra-brand competition. Nonetheless, there are various types of such marketplaces, which could be distinguished on the basis of their particular characteristics. These include: (a) whether online marketplaces are pure or hybrid intermediaries (pure intermediaries are merely platforms for buyers and sellers, while hybrid intermediaries provide a sales platform but also act as retailers on their own platform); (b) open or closed marketplaces (any seller can gain access to an open marketplace, while closed marketplaces impose access restrictions); (iii) the type and quality of the interface on…

Asda Stores Ld & Ors v MasterCard 2017 EWHC 93 (Comm)

This decision – available here – concerns a standalone claim for damages against MasterCard brought before the English courts. As some of you will know, disputes over the legality of Multilateral Interchange Fees (MIFs) and various payment card-schemes has been ongoing for well over a decade.  In the US, it included a decision on the legality of the American Express System which has found its way to the Supreme Court docket. In this case, which follows a decision by the European Commission – but is not a follow on claim since the practices in question, while similar, are not the same ones that were subject to the Commission’s decision – the English courts had to decide whether the level at which MasterCard set its MIFs was illegal, and hence whether damages are due. You may be pleased to hear that the decision is long and complicated – if nothing else, because it conducts an in-depth effects based assessment that hinges…

Pablo Ibanez Colomo and Alfonso Lamadrid ‘On the notion of restriction of competition: what we know and what we don’t know we know’

This paper is published in Gerard, Merola and Meyring, Bernd, (eds.) The Notion of Restriction of Competition: Revisiting the Foundations of Antitrust Enforcement in Europe. (Bruylant), and can be found here. One  who is not familiar with competition law would presume that the concept of restriction of competition must surely be well established, as otherwise how can one identify those practices that restrict competition? As anyone who is closer to the action knows , the concept is not really that well established in practice. This paper’s argument is that there is much greater consensus about the concept of restriction of competition in the EU that is usually acknowledged. Instead of presenting a normative view of what a “restriction of competition” should be, this piece systematically reviews the incremental contributions that the EU courts have made to the definition of the notion of restriction of competition, and finds broad agreement around some fundamental questions. In order to do this, the paper is…

Giancarlo Spagnolo and Catarina Marvão ‘Cartels and Leniency: Taking stock of what we learnt’

This paper, available at, reviews the literature on the incentives of leniency applicants.  It is a really useful piece for anyone doing leniency work, and extremely thorough. It is not possible to  provide a summary of the paper: it reviews too many papers and possible scenarios (the first section looks at economic models, the second at empirical evidence). If there is a basic argument underpinning all of this, it seems to be that incentives to increase cartel enforcement results may not be well-aligned with maximising welfare /  may lead to excessively generous leniency conditions; and that leniency reduces collusion but that the EU is too nice to cartelists and extends leniency to far too many companies.

Wouter Wils ‘The Use of Leniency in EU Cartel Enforcement: An Assessment After Twenty Years’

This paper by Wouter Wils – available at – describes  20 years of leniency in Europe. In addition to some interesting statistics, it contains an overview of arguments for and against the use of leniency. It is useful for anyone doing bid-rigging / promoting the virtues of competition, but putting at risk the job of thousands of trainee lawyers who will no longer have a job searching for examples of the practical application of  leniency by the European Commission.