Herbert Hovenkamp ‘Platforms and the Rule of Reason: The American Express Case’ (2019) Columbia Business Law Review, 1 34

In Ohio v. American Express Co. (“Amex”), the Supreme Court had its first explicit opportunity to apply the rule of reason to an allegedly anticompetitive practice on a two-sided platform– i.e. a business that depends on relationships between two different, noncompeting groups of transaction partners (e.g. newspapers, as regards readers and advertisers). This article, available here, considers how the rule of reason should be applied to an exclusionary practice on a platform market. It considers the rule of reason’s basic burden-shifting framework, unique elements of market delineation on platform markets, and the relevance of placing production complements into the same “market.” It criticises the Supreme Court’s unjustified conclusion that a market definition is necessary in an antitrust challenge to a vertical practice; its odd treatment of free rider problems; its lack of attention to the record and to economic analysis; and its confusion of total with marginal harms and benefits. Finally, it looks at the implications of the Court’s decision for market…

Pinar Akman on ‘Online Platforms, Agency and Competition Law: Mind the Gap’ (2019) 43 Fordham International Law Journal 209

The platform business model, inasmuch as it facilitates contracts between suppliers and customers, displays the qualities of an agency relationship more than any other commercial arrangement – and many platforms do indeed claim that they are mere agents. Since EU competition law does not apply to agreements between principals and agents – even where such agreements restrict competition – the implication would be that anticompetitive agreements between a platform and suppliers would fall outside the scope of, and could not be scrutinised by EU competition law. The same principle would apply to other competition system that adopts such an approach to agency (e.g. the US and many others). As a result, there is potentially a “platform gap” in the application of competition law in digital markets. This article, available here, argues that platforms’ relationships with their suppliers can be categorised as a principal-agent arrangement falling outside the scope of competition law. Since this “immunity” from competition law can have significant implications for…