This is a paper – published in the George Mason Law Review and available at http://www.georgemasonlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/Kovacic-and-Hyman_ReadyforJCI.pdf – by Bill Kovacic and David Hyman on the desirability of competition agencies having regulatory competences in addition to those related to antitrust, and on how the spill-over between these various areas of competence may work.

The paper provides a theoretical framework (the first of its kind, as far as I’m aware) for the various types of leveraging of competition and other regulatory concerns in practice, both inter- and intra-agencies . It also includes examples of the various types of spill-over that may occur, mainly by reference to FTC work but also including some European authorities; and a cost-benefit analysis of the various types of spill-over (bottom line: “it depends, but regulatory spill-over should mainly be avoided”).

Good stuff, potentially useful.

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