Mario Siragusa and Alessandro Comino on ‘Private Antitrust Enforcement in Italy’ (2019) CPI June

Italy has a long-standing tradition of private antitrust enforcement. This piece, available here, provides an overview of Italy’s private enforcement regime, focusing on developments brought about by Italy’s implementation of the EU Damages Directive in early 2017. This reform introduced a number of substantive and procedural provisions to facilitate damages claims by victims of antitrust infringements. As a result, the authors expect private antitrust litigation in Italy, and particularly follow-on actions, to increase. The note begins with a description of how private enforcement changed following the implementation of the EU Damages Directive. The Italian legislator took advantage of the transposition of the Directive to reform the rules regarding disclosure of evidence. The Italian system already contained a provision regulating disclosure (Article 210 of the Civil Procedure Code). However, this provision required the party seeking disclosure to show that the evidence to be disclosed was necessary and indispensable for the case. In addition, the courts interpreted this provision narrowly as allowing them…

Felipe Irarrázabal ‘Competition and the plague’ (‘La libre competencia y la peste)

This piece is available here, but only in Spanish. The summary below reflects my own translation of the piece. Emergencies – such as wars and natural disasters – undermine the assumptions underpinning competition law and policy. Competition enforcement against cartels builds on the premise that fierce competition is highly beneficial for society, whereas firm cooperation will only create benefits in much more restricted situations. Competition enforcement also relies on legal procedures, which are by nature slow and lend themselves to sophisticated disputes. Covid-19 has forced authorities to enact exceptional regimes and pressured them to take urgent and even drastic measures. The coming economic recession will likely require similar measures. The main competition agencies in the world have started to react to this negative scenario. Several of them have declared that they will be alert to any possible violation of competition law. Others have specified that they will not accept excessive prices as a result of the crisis (although this legal…

Jonathan T. Fried ‘The place of competition and development in the global trade and economic architecture’ (2017) Concurrences 1 3

The author was the Canadian ambassador to the WTO. In this piece, available here, which is the opening speech to a conference on ‘Competition and globalization in developing economies’, he argues that trade liberalisation must be accompanied by sound economic regulation that enables trade and investment to occur. Robust and effective competition law and regulation is a key element of this enabling environment, and a potential contributor to sustainable development as well. The trade and competition communities have been supporting each other’s goals, and applying similar approaches, for some time. Building on this base, there are actions that will lead to the better integration of trade and competition perspectives, while avoiding being drawn into grand debates about new forms of global governance, as has happened in the past. In a first section, the paper provides an overview of the international trade regime. From its post-war beginnings as an “interim” agreement called the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (‘GATT’) through…

Chiara Muraca ‘Cultural and Political Forces in the Criminalisation of Cartels: A Case Study on the Chilean Experience’ (2018) World Competition 579

In addition to rising monetary fines against both companies and individuals, over the last ten years more than thirty countries have decided to criminalise cartel activities. At the same time, and despite the growing number of countries opting for a criminal enforcement, the implementation of such measures has been quite deficient outside the US. Many of these countries have encountered procedural and political obstacles to enforcing criminal provisions against anticompetitive conduct, including a lack of support from key players in the enforcement process. Among the main explanations for this state of affairs is a belief that criminalisation of cartels outside the US is often the product of a top-down process led by transnational enforcement interests rather than domestic bottom-up forces. The aim of this article, available here, is to test this explanation by conducting an empirical study of criminalisation efforts in Chile. The study involved interviews with the main stakeholders who took part in the criminalisation process in Chile, such…