Rennato Nazzini ‘Fresh evidence on appeal in two-tier administrative enforcement systems’ and Despoina Mantzari ‘Navigating the admission of evidence on appeal’ (2018) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 6(2) 281

A second and third paper contain a discussion between two scholars – Rennato Nazzini and Despoina Mantzari – on whether an appellant should be able to introduce fresh evidence during a judicial review before a court. The discussion concerns a decision by the UK’s Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) in Ping Europe Ltd v Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) – the CAT’s first decision on the admission of new evidence in appeal proceedings on the basis of rule 21(2) of the CAT Rules 2015. This was a ruling on an application by the CMA to exclude certain evidence adduced by Ping that, in the CMA’s view, Ping could and should have adduced during the administrative proceedings. The facts were as follow. The CMA claimed that Ping had infringed the Chapter I prohibition and Article 101 TFEU by prohibiting online sales of its golf equipment. In response to the statement of objections (SO), Ping argued, among other things, that its prohibition on…

Makam Delrahim (Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. DoJ) ‘Antitrust Enforcement in the Digital Era’

In these remarks, hich can be found here, AAG Delrahim defends the ‘broad antitrust consensus that still reigns today’ and considers how it might apply to the digital sphere. He begins by outlining the two key components of the current antitrust consensus. The first is the consumer welfare standard, which requires that some business practices should be condemned as unlawful only where they harm competition in such a way that consumers suffer. The second component is “evidence-based enforcement”. Outside the realm of naked horizontal restraints such as price fixing, bid rigging, and market allocation, antitrust demands evidence of harm or likely harm to competition, often weighed against efficiencies or procompetitive justifications. Evidence-based enforcement also requires a readiness to adapt our existing antitrust framework and tools to new or emerging threats to competition. One such threat comes from digital platforms and the increased market concentration they give rise to. AGG Delrahim considers that the antitrust consensus approach is flexible to new business…

How to define two-sided markets? Ohio v American Experess

A recent US Supreme Court decision is  likely to have an impact on antitrust practice: Ohio v American Express 585 U. S. [to be determined] (2018), available here. In short, the case is about the correct antitrust treatment of anti-steering provisions introduced by American Express (Amex) into its contracts with merchants. The United States and several States (collectively, the plaintiffs) sued Amex, claiming that its anti-steering provisions violate §1 of the Sherman Act. The District Court agreed, finding that the credit-card market should be treated as two separate markets—one for merchants and one for cardholders—and that Amex’s anti-steering provisions are anticompetitive because they prevent competition in the merchant side of the market and results in higher merchant fees. The Second Circuit reversed; it determined that the credit-card market is a single market, not two separate ones; and that Amex’s anti-steering provisions did not infringe the Sherman Act. You may remember that I reviewed the Circuit court decision almost two years…

Thomas Hoppner ‘A Duty to Treat Downstream Rivals Equally: (Merely) a Natural Remedy to Google’s Monopoly Leveraging Abuse’ (2017) European Competition and Regulatory Law Review (3)208

This  paper – which can be found here – reviews the European Commission’s decision in the Google case, and the remedy that the Commission imposed in that decision. It argues that this decision follows settled law regarding anti-competitive extensions of dominance from a primary market to a distinct, but related, secondary market. It also seeks to refute the argument that the decision created a novel rule that a dominant company may not favour its own services – instead, it is argued that this requirement is merely the remedy that the Commission imposed to bring Google’s infringement to an end. The paper is structured as follows: A first section provides an overview of the decision and some critical reactions to it. The Commission fined Google for having abused its market dominance as a search engine by promoting its comparison shopping service, Google Shopping, and demoting rival services. Describing the abuse, the EC explained that it: “objects to the fact that Google…

Paul Nihoul, Freedom of choice: The emergence of a powerful concept in European competition law, September 2012, Concurrences Review N° 3-2012, Art. N° 48102, pp. 55

This chapter – which can be found here – argues that a number of European Commission and European court decisions bring to the forefront a legal test that has so far merited limited attention—the concept of choice, understood as the possibility, and the right, for customers to choose freely both the products/services best suited to their needs, and the economic partners they want to deal with. This legal test is analysed in this essay, which is divided into three parts: Part II examines cases where this new test is said to emerge more clearly. These are mainly Art. 102 TFEU cases – and the most important one is, arguably, a case regarding predatory pricing of internet services by France Telecom. France Telecom argued that recoupment was necessary for pricing below costs to be anticompetitive. The European Court of Justice dismissed this argument. Even if consumers would benefit from lower prices on aggregate, this would not eliminate all competitive harm: inasmuch…

David Evans ‘The Economics of Attention Markets’

This paper – which can be found here – describes the fundamental economic features of the markets where attention platforms acquire time from consumers, and then sell access to that time to advertisers who want to deliver messages to those consumers – and introduces an economic framework that should assist in the application of competition law in these markets. It is structured as follows: Section II introduces an economic framework for analysing the allocation of time by consumers, which is one of the main competitive vectors in certain platform markets. It begins by describing the amount of time that American consumers spend consuming content on ad-supported media. It then relies on the economic theory of household production to analyse the value to consumers of the time they spend on such media. In the basic model, people derive utility from a range of household activities, each of which consists of a combination of market goods and time spent on them. People…

Thibault Schrepel ‘The “Enhanced No Economic Sense’ Test: Experimenting with Predatory Innovation’ (forthcoming on the NYU Journal of Intellectual Property and Entertainment Law).

The paper – which can be downloaded here – seeks to deal with a significant challenge for competition law, which has become more prominent with the proliferation of high tech markets: several practices, and particularly non-price strategies, fall outside the scope of competition law because mechanisms for assessing their legality are not adequate. The author’s ambition is to contribute to the literature by advancing a new test, called the “enhanced no economic sense” test, to be applied to non-price strategies. The paper proceeds in three steps: The first part presents the enhanced no-economic sense test. This test is based on the simple idea that a practice should be regarded as anti-competitive if it only makes sense from an economic point of view because of its tendency to eliminate or to restrict competition. Unlike the ‘profit sacrifice test’, the no-economic sense test allows for the condemnation of practices that do not lead to the infringer. The test follows four steps: Step…

Nicolas Petit ‘Technology Giants, the Moligopoly Hypothesis and Holistic Competition’

The gist of the argument in this paper – which can be found here – is intriguing, and plausible: tech giants do not compete within itemized relevant markets where they are monopolists. Instead, they are conglomerates that compete three-dimensionally as oligopolists across industries, which is what the author meant by a moligopoly. This blindness of antitrust to competition across markets is likely to lead to mistakes, and should be rectified. The paper is structured as follows: Section I sets out the moligopoly hypothesis and tests it by reference to empirical data. The author begins by reviewing how the competition law literature’s default position is to characterise the tech giants as dominant firms. Competition law focuses on one industry segment – i.e. a “relevant market” – where the investigated tech giants often enjoy unassailable clout, and where substitution by actual or potential rivals is unlikely. For example, Google’s competitive stronghold is search, Apple’s core is its unique ecosystem, Facebook’s moat is…

David Evans  ‘Why the Dynamics of Competition for Online Platforms Lead to Sleepless Nights but Not to Sleepy Monopolies’

This paper – which can be found here – makes more use of the dismal science than the paper above, but makes a similar point: claims that online platforms have secured permanent monopolies protected by barriers to entry arising from network effects and stockpiles of data are inconsistent with economics, the technology literature, and the history of online competition. The paper is structured as follows: Section I provides an Introduction. It notes that: “The record is replete with forecasts, soon proved wrong and then forgotten, that winners that took all, or most, were unbeatable’. Furthermore, there are four reasons why comparison to old staid corporate giants is unsuited to online platforms. First, turbulent waves of disruptive innovation have constantly shaken the business models of platform leaders and opened new avenues for entry and competition since the dawn of the digital age. Second, online platforms pegged as leaders in one area compete with each other in many other areas. They identify…

ric Biber, Sarah Light (Berkeley), J. B. Ruhl, and James Salzman (UCLA) “Regulating Business Innovation as Policy Disruption: From the Model T to Airbnb” (2017) 70 Vand. L. Rev. 1561

The argument of this paper – which can be found here – is straightforward: scholarship about the platform economy has been ahistorical; focusing on the immediacy and novelty of the platform economy misses the fact that its interaction with the legal system does not raise fundamentally new questions from a law and policy perspective. From a business or economic perspective, history is full of technological and management advances that fundamentally disrupted business models over a brief period of time. This is not to say that current developments do not pose challenges to public policy. Regulatory policy generally—even necessarily—presumes a certain kind of organizational model for the activities that it regulates.  When business innovation upends that pre-existing model, the result is a disjunction between the structure of the regulatory system and the industry that is being regulated: a policy disruption. This has occurred in the past. Debates over whether and how the regulatory system should adjust to the rise of platforms…