William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall and Michael J. Meurer on ‘Serial collusion by multi-product firms’ (2018) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 6 96

This paper, available here, is long and so, I am afraid, is the review. In short, the authors of this paper take issue with the assumption that each cartel in which a given firm participates is a single instance of conduct that is independent of other cartel conduct by the firm. Evidence of serial collusion by major multi-product firms is readily observable from the public record in a number of sectors, such as chemicals, electronics, car-parts, financial products or graphite. Further, collusion persists in at least three of these industries, with new investigations having recently been opened into collusion in the chemical, auto parts, and financial products markets. The paper provides empirical evidence that many multi-product firms have each participated in several cartels over the past 50 years. It argues that traditional assumptions regarding how cartelists operate, and consequent enforcement strategies, are deficient in many aspects. Reflecting this, the authors make policy recommendations to reign in serial collusion. The article is structured as…

Andres Caro ‘Leveraging market power online: the Google Shopping case’ (2018) Competition Law Journal 17(1) 49

The Google Shopping case raises many important questions, such as: how do we deal with the leveraging of market power in digital markets? How do we weigh the benefits to consumers against the potential harm to competition? And, lastly, what are the appropriate remedies for this type of behaviour? In addressing these questions, this paper is structured as follows: A first section describes the background to the Google Shopping decision by the European Commission. Google aggregates, sorts, displays and provides direct access to retailers’ webpages in exchange for a fee through Google Shopping. Other online platforms, including Nextag, Foundem and Shopzilla, offer similar services. However, until early 2018 ‘while competing comparison shopping services can appear only as generic search results and are prone to the ranking of their web pages in generic search results on Google’s general search results pages being reduced (‘demoted’) by certain algorithms, Google’s own comparison shopping service is prominently positioned, displayed in rich format and is…

Giovanna Massarotto ‘From Standard Oil to Google: How the Role of Antitrust Law Has Changed’ (2018) World Competition 41(3) 395

This paper, which can be found here, explores the evolution of antitrust over time, and how some of the challenges with network businesses are recurring issues for competition law. It is structured as follows: Section 1 examines the evolution of antitrust law over time. Before the introduction of antitrust law, markets were generally subject to self-regulation. Antitrust was introduced to regulate a number of business practices without engaging in full-fledged regulation. Nonetheless, antitrust has teeth and can be quite intrusive. A first example of this can be seen in the Standard Oil case. Standard Oil’s success was mainly due to a set of mergers and trusts it entered into with its competitors and railroads. The result of this success was that, by the 1890s, most businesses had to deal with Standard Oil or with one of the constituents of its extensive trust l. In order to address the  ‘evil of restriction of output’, the Supreme Court ordered the dissolution of the…

Joe Harrington “A Proposal for a Structural Remedy for Illegal Collusion“ Antitrust Law Journal, Forthcoming

The argument of this paper – which can be found here – is straightforward: competition authorities should use a structural remedy when penalising some cartels. The remedy would force cartel member(s) to sell productive assets to other firms for the purpose of making the market more competitive.  Given the people the author thanks, and the example he provides, I believe this was inspired by the recent Brazilian experience. The paper begins with an overview of developments in cartel sanctions over the last 30 years, including: (i) the adoption of leniency programs, (ii) a marked increase in the amount of pecuniary penalties, and (iii) the imposition of criminal sanctions. However, ‘Even if all of these developments have resulted in substantial progress in the fight against cartels, the evidence is that current enforcement falls well short of being an effective deterrent. Many cartels continue to form and operate (…). Furthermore, many of these cartels are not the product of rogue employees but…