Harry First and Stephen Webber Wallace ‘Pairing Public and Private Antitrust Remedies’ in Albert A. Foer Liber Amicorum, Concurrences (Forthcoming)

Discussions on private competition remedies most often deal with questions of optimal deterrence and effectiveness. Lost in conversation is the basic idea that antitrust violations cause economic harm, and that those victimised by that harm should be entitled to damages from those who have violated the law. This is the underappreciated compensatory function of antitrust. Section 4A of the Clayton Act is a powerful, yet historically underused enforcement tool that empowers the United States to obtain treble damages for anticompetitive conduct when the government is itself the victim. The paper, which can be found here, focuses on whether the US government should not only pursue public enforcement activities, but also engage in private enforcement claims to be compensated for losses as a result of anticompetitive conduct. It examines the limited use of Section 4A, and discusses some possibilities for future cooperation between public and private plaintiffs that could advance the compensatory goal of antitrust. It is structured as follows: Section I looks…

Nicolo Zingales ‘Antitrust intent in an age of algorithmic nudging’ (2019) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 7 386

This article, available here, surveys EU case law on the role of anticompetitive intent in abuses of dominance, with the goal of understanding how intent can be relevant to the assignment of liability for anticompetitive algorithmic outcomes. The role of subjective intent in EU antitrust analysis remains controversial. Some argue that evidence of intent is an invaluable tool in the antitrust arsenal, allowing agencies and litigants to address anticompetitive conduct where facts are ambiguous or evidence of harm to competition inconclusive. Others warn against relying on intent. First, ‘sales talks’ encouraging employees to beat – and indeed eliminate – competitors is common and merely indicative of a (competitively desirable) aggressive business strategy. Secondly, banning any exhortation to compete aggressively would encourage firms to deploy more subtle forms of inducement when engaged in anticompetitive conduct, while favouring those with the resources to develop such strategies. The law seems to follow a middle path in this debate, suggesting that the notion of subjective…

Peter Alexiadis and Alexandre de Streel  ‘Designing an EU Intervention Standard for Digital Gatekeepers’ (working paper)

This paper is quite long and dense, so I am afraid this review will be both as well. A series of studies and reports on digital platforms have suggested that antitrust policy requires an overhaul. This view is driven by the belief that, as regards digital markets, the risk of making “Type 2” errors (i.e., under-enforcement) is greater than the risk of making “Type 1” errors (i.e., over-enforcement); and that, in addition to competition enforcement, there may be a role for regulation as well. While the authors take the view that the imperative for radical change is less pressing in the European Union than elsewhere, it is nonetheless appropriate to develop a blueprint for intervention against digital platforms both ex post and ex ante. This blueprint is developed as follows: A first section outlines the principles governing when to intervene in the digital economy. The Internet has generated significant levels of consumer welfare. Digital markets nevertheless have characteristics which lend…

Gregory Werden and Luke Froeb  ‘Antitrust and Tech: Europe and the United States Differ, and it matters’ (working paper)

While merger and cartel enforcement lead to similar outcomes on both sides of the pond, there are significant differences regarding “abuse of dominance” and “monopolisation”. The European Commission and some national competition authorities in Europe have taken on tech giants in high-profile cases. However, hard-wired differences between the European and American enforcement regimes make very difficult for the US antitrust enforcement agencies to emulate their European counterparts. This piece, available here, seeks to identify these differences. A first set of differences relates to how an administrative model prevails in Europe, while the US system is mostly accusatorial. The European system was conceived of as regulation enforced by an administrative agency, not as law enforcement by the courts as in the US.  One important distinction in this respect is that a contested court order in the United States typically contains a series of conduct mandates and prohibitions, while administrative decisions usually merely provide for cease-and-desist orders. Furthermore, the European system is driven by…

Jay Matthew Strader ‘Google, Monopolization, Refusing to Deal and the Duty to Promote Economic Activity’ (2019) International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 50(5) 559

Almost no consumers have the resources to assess the quality of information online. Search engines seek to remedy asymmetries in information, effectively providing a quality certification service to consumers. Google claims to rank organic results ‘‘scientifically’,’ based strictly on relevance and the quality of the listings. Ninety two percent of all Google search traffic occurs on the first page, encompassing the top ten organic results and paid ads, which reflects high levels of consumer trust.   This paper, available here, argues that Google’s search engine is indispensable for innumerable companies, which cannot compete effectively when Google fails to rank organic results according to relevance. However, Google’s ad-based business model creates incentives for it to promote paying advertisers or its own business, in particular by lowering the rank of more relevant results. This leads to lower quality in the search market, to lower output in downstream markets and, ultimately, to lower consumer welfare – independently of whether Google operates downstream or…

Pablo Ibáñez Colomo ‘Legal tests in EU competition law: taxonomy and operation’ (2019) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice

EU competition law does not apply a single legal test. However, the existence of various legal tests is not commonly acknowledged, nor has it been studied systematically. This paper, available here, seeks to bridge this gap. (c) Pablo Ibanez Colomo One of the objectives of this paper is to draw a map of the existing legal tests, and to clarify where each of the practices stands along a spectrum ranging from those deemed prohibited irrespective of their effects and those deemed lawful. According to the author, legal tests in EU competition law can be grouped into four main categories. First, some practices are prima facie unlawful irrespective of their effects. Secondly, some conducts are deemed prima facie lawful. Thirdly, some behaviour is subject to a ‘standard effects’ test, which seeks to ascertain whether it has, or is likely to have, anticompetitive effects in the economic and legal context in which it is implemented. Finally, an ‘enhanced effects’ test applies in…

Carsten Koenig ‘Comparing Parent Company Liability in EU and US Competition Law’ (2018) World Competition 41(1) 69

This paper, available here , contrasts how law parent companies can be fined for antitrust infringements by their subsidiaries under EU competition law, while courts in the US are reluctant to hold parent companies directly or indirectly liable in private damages suits. The author argues that one of the main reasons why EU competition law holds parent companies liable is to solve an under-deterrence problem that occurs when subsidiaries lack sufficient assets to pay fines or damages. US antitrust law uses other enforcement instruments to address under-deterrence by, in particular the individual liability of managers and employees. The article consists of four substantive parts: In section 2, the paper reviews the case law and literature on parent company liability for antitrust infringements by subsidiaries in the European Union and the United States. In the EU, the single economic entity doctrine is deeply ingrained in competition law. The European court interprets the concept of ‘undertaking’ in a functional way: it is the economic entity…

Eric Barbier de La Serre and Eileen Lagathu ‘The Law on Fines Imposed in EU Competition Proceedings’ (2018) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 9(7) 459

This paper, available here, provides a brief overview of a number of important issues regarding fining in Europe up to 2018. There is no specific argument being made, just an overview of the state of play at the time this paper was published. Section I discusses how the statute of limitations affects fine amounts. The Commission’s power to impose fines for substantive infringements is subject to a 5-year limitation period from the date the infringement was committed – or, in the case of a continuing or repeated infringement, from the date when the infringement ceased – unless formal steps to investigate or prosecute the infringement have been taken by a competition authority during that period. Each interruption produces effects erga omnes, in so far as the limitation period starts running afresh in respect of all undertakings that participated in the infringement. Furthermore, the fact that the conduct of subsidiaries falls outside the scope of the statute of limitation does not preclude proceedings from…

Javier Garcia-Verdugo, Carlos Merino Troncoso and Lorena Gomez Cruz ‘An Economic Assessment of Antitrust Fines in Spain’ (2018) World Competition Law and Economics Review 41(3) 335

This article, available here, tries to quantify the deterrent power of fines imposed by the Spanish competition authority from 2011 to 2015. Despite being authored by senior staff at the Spanish competition authority, the paper concludes that most of the fines imposed by the Spanish competition authority during this period were under deterrent. The argument is structured as follows: Section II sets out how to quantify cartel gains. A deterrent optimal fine can be defined as a fine that deters a company from participating in a cartel. Such an outcome is achieved when there is no expected net gain from participating in the cartel in the first place, i.e. when the expected illicit gain of entering into a cartel is lower than the expected loss from being sanctioned for cartel participation. Therefore, the reference value for an optimal fine should be determined by reference to an estimate of the illicit gain (also known as excess profit) flowing from cartel membership. This illicit…

Douglas Ginsburg and Cecilia (Yixi) Cheng  ‘The Decline in U.S. Criminal Antitrust Cases’ George Mason University Law & Economics Research Paper Series 19-31 (Forthcoming in Liber Amicorum Albert A. Foer (2020) Nicolas Charbit et al. (eds)

Criminal cartel prosecutions are at modern lows in the U.S. The authors of this paper, available here, offer three non-exclusive hypotheses for this decline: (1) increasingly large fines in multiple jurisdictions have lessened the incentive to apply for leniency in any one jurisdiction; (2) technology has caused the substitution of lawful tacit for unlawful express collusion; and (3) competition policy has succeeded in deterring cartel formation – at least among U.S. companies. Copyright: FT While the available data is too limited to reach a definite conclusion, it seems to support the third hypothesis: since 2008, investigations have focused predominantly on foreign companies, while both the number and share of investigated U.S. companies have decreased. This is consistent with the hypothesis that U.S. competition policy has been effective in deterring anti-competitive conduct by US companies. Section II describes the recent downward trend in cartel prosecutions. The number of criminal cases filed annually by the DoJ decreased from 90 in 2011 to 18 in…