C. Scott Hemphill and Nancy L. Rose on ‘Mergers that Harm Sellers’ (2018) Yale Law Journal 127(1) 2078

In typical mergers, the main concern is that the parties will be able to raise the prices they charge purchasers. Some mergers, however, reduce competition among competing buyers, thereby reducing the prices that sellers receive for their products and services. These adverse “buy-side” effects may harm a wide variety of sellers, including workers.  This paper, available here, examines the antitrust treatment of mergers that harm sellers. Its central claim is that harm to sellers in an input market is sufficient to support antitrust liability. Part I considers mergers that increase classical monopsony power. Monopsony is used here as the mirror image of monopoly, i.e. market power susceptible of affecting the price of inputs. Monopsony is a frequent concern in labour and agricultural markets. As with lawfully acquired monopoly power, antitrust law does not prohibit the exercise of lawfully acquired monopsony power, despite its economic costs. Yet antitrust problems do arise when buyers increase their monopsony power by combining forces. Agreements…

Eliana Garcés and Daniel Gaynor, deals with ‘Conglomerate Mergers: Developments and a Call for Caution’ (2019) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 10(7) 457

Traditionally, conglomerate mergers have raised little antitrust concern since the merging companies’ products were not perceived to compete with each other or to be critical in the merger parties’ value chain. The assessment of these mergers has generally consisted of a check for potential foreclosure strategies by way of tying or the reduction of technological interoperability. More recently, new theories of harm emerged from bargaining theories and dynamic considerations. These theories acknowledge a greater concern about dynamic effects of mergers on innovation, that an increasing number of markets exhibit bargaining power on both sides of a transaction, and that mergers of complements may not be innocuous in markets for increasingly complex products. This paper, available here, argues that these new theories are not suitable to generate ex ante decision-making rules; instead, their applicability will need to be empirically validated on a case-by-case basis. Section 2 deals with the traditional treatment of conglomerate mergers. The most common theories of harm traditionally…