Marc van der Voude ‘Judicial Control in Complex Economic Matters’ (2019) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 10(7) 415

Already in the early 1960’s, the Court of Justice made clear that the application of competition law depends on contextual analysis that takes a wide range of economic and legal factors into account. Modern economics provides useful tools to deal with competition matters. The European Commission increasingly relies on these ‘mainstream’ economics in its assessment of competition cases, and courts have to make up their own mind on the merits of the Commission’s complex assessments and of the economic concepts on which the Commission relied to that effect. What kind of judicial control are the Union courts supposed to exercise over these complex assessments?  Under the current system set up by Article 263 TFEU, judicial review by the General Court, which has the final say on the interpretation of the facts of the case, is limited to the review of the legality of the Commission’s decision. In its case law, the Court of Justice has traditionally used formulae that suggest…

Massimiliano Kadar ‘Article 102 and Exclusivity Rebates in a Post-Intel World: Lessons from the Qualcomm and Google Android Cases’ (2019) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 10(7) 439

Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) prohibits behaviour by a dominant undertaking that is capable of harming competition. The notion of ‘capability to harm competition’ has been at the centre of the legal and economic debate for many years. A strict interpretation of ‘capability’ would require evidence of actual or quasi-actual effects on the market in the form of, for example, the exit of existing competitors or sustained price increases. A lax interpretation of capability could make it possible to enforce competition rules also in circumstances where harm to competition is purely hypothetical and not supported by concrete evidence. This discussion – which is ultimately about the level of the standard of proof – not only influences the likelihood of Type 1 and Type 2 letters, but also the amount of resources that administrative agencies needs to devote to individual enforcement cases. Modulating this impact are presumptions, which can lead to significant savings…

Cani Fernández ‘Presumptions and Burden of Proof in EU Competition Law: The Intel Judgment’ (2019) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 10(7)

Some of the procedural tools used by competition authorities and courts (in particular, presumptions) present an inherent link to the burden of proof and to the rightful exercise of the rights of the defence. In principle, the use of presumptions can be an efficient response to the enforcement of competition policy both in situations where a given behaviour usually amounts to an infringement or where it is competitively innocuous. In any rule of law system, presumptions of illegality must be rebuttable. Indeed, a resort to presumptions not surrounded by proper procedural guarantees may infringe the presumption of innocence and undertakings’ rights of defence. The Intel judgment provides a good opportunity to discuss the role of presumptions under Article 102 TFEU and their implications for the burden of proof. In addition to this, this article, available here, analyses how defendants in exclusivity rebate cases can rebut the presumption of illegality in practice, with a special focus on the efficiency defence. It does so…