Daniel Sokol ‘Reinvigorating Criminal Antitrust?’ (2019) William & Mary Law Review 60 1545

A number of non-cartel antitrust infringements remain crimes under US law, even if they are not prosecuted in practice. This article, available here, deals with the implications of recent claims for increased antitrust enforcement for the application of such provisions.  A natural extension of enforcement would be to advocate the use of criminal sanctions for various antitrust violations outside of collusion which are “on the books” but have not been used in over a generation. The article argues that a return to the criminalisation of non-collusion related antitrust abuses is problematic not only as a matter of optimal deterrence, but also unconstitutional as a matter of law. Section one describes how antitrust criminalisation is a form of achieving deterrence. Antitrust enforcement builds on models of optimal deterrence. Under an optimal deterrence antitrust framework, a firm or individual will be deterred where the expected costs of illegal activity, taking into account the probability of detection and magnitude of the penalties, exceed…

Beatrice Stange on ‘Romano Pisciotti v Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Increased Risk of Extradition for EU Citizens after Involvement in US Cartels’ (2019) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 10(2) 89

This paper, available here , discusses the first deportation of an EU citizen to the US for competition law infringements. It focuses on a recent judgment by the Court of Justice of the European Union on this matter. A first section outlines the factual background of the case. In 2010, a US arrest warrant was issued for Italian businessman Romano Pisciotti on account of his involvement in the marine hoses cartel. In 2013, the German federal police arrested Mr. Pisciotti at Frankfurt Airport during a stopover of his flight from Nigeria to Italy. He was provisionally detained and, a few months later, the German authorities accepted the US request for extradition despite Mr. Pisciotti’s legal appeals, inter alia before the German Federal Constitutional Court. Other extradition requests from the US authorities had so far been unsuccessful, mainly because most international extradition agreements (including the Treaty between Germany and the US) require that the sanctioned conduct must be a crime in…

Chiara Muraca ‘Cultural and Political Forces in the Criminalisation of Cartels: A Case Study on the Chilean Experience’ (2018) World Competition 579

In addition to rising monetary fines against both companies and individuals, over the last ten years more than thirty countries have decided to criminalise cartel activities. At the same time, and despite the growing number of countries opting for a criminal enforcement, the implementation of such measures has been quite deficient outside the US. Many of these countries have encountered procedural and political obstacles to enforcing criminal provisions against anticompetitive conduct, including a lack of support from key players in the enforcement process. Among the main explanations for this state of affairs is a belief that criminalisation of cartels outside the US is often the product of a top-down process led by transnational enforcement interests rather than domestic bottom-up forces. The aim of this article, available here, is to test this explanation by conducting an empirical study of criminalisation efforts in Chile. The study involved interviews with the main stakeholders who took part in the criminalisation process in Chile, such…