Robert D. Anderson, Alison Jones and Bill Kovacic ‘Preventing Corruption, Supplier Collusion and the Corrosion of Civic Trust: A Procompetitive Program to Improve the Effectiveness and Legitimacy of Public Procurement’ (forthcoming, George Mason Law Review)

You can find this paper here. There is also a shorter version of the paper available here. Governments around the world spend an estimated US$9.5 trillion on goods and services each year. This accounts for roughly one third of government expenditures (29.1% on average in OECD countries) and 10% to 20% of total gross domestic product (“GDP”) in many nations. Furthermore, public procurement is an essential input to the delivery of broader public services and functions of government that are vital for growth, development and social welfare. The special procedures that characterise public procurement are necessary in light of the principal-agent problem and moral hazards that public procurement entails. Conventional responses to the problems of corruption and supplier collusion in public procurement comprise two broad sets of tools. The first, focusing on corruption issues, involves measures to increase the transparency of public procurement and to strengthen the accountability of responsible public officials for malfeasance. The second, aimed at preventing supplier collusion,…

John Connor and Dan Werner  ‘Variation in Bid-Rigging Cartels’ Overcharges: An Exploratory Study’

This working paper  is available here. A summary version, called ‘New Research on the Effectiveness of Bidding Rings: Implications for Competition Policies’ (2019) CPI Antitrust Chronicle April,  can be found here but I have to say I found this shorter version to be slightly confusing, so I would advise you to read the longer paper. There seems to be a consensus that bid rigging is more harmful and deserving of higher penalties than ordinary price fixing violations. Reflecting this, there is empirical evidence that antitrust penalties are more severe for rings than for classic price-fixing cartels. A number of jurisdictions, such as Germany and Italy, impose criminal liability only for bid rigging infringements, but not for other types of cartel. Multilateral organisations, such as the OECD and the International Competition Network, have given special attention to the problems of enforcement against bid rigging. Yet, this antipathy toward bid rigging relative to the more common form of collusive conduct (classic price…