Eckart Bueren, Kai Hüschelrath, and Tobias Veith ‘Time is Money–How Much Money is Time? Interest and Inflation in Competition Law Actions for Damages’ (2016) Antitrust Law Journal 81(1) 271

One aspect that is often overlooked, but is of enormous practical importance in competition damages cases, is the way a legal system deals with costs associated with the passage of time, as expressed through interest and inflation. Cartel damages generally are spread over a cartel’s lifespan, which can be long; furthermore, a considerable amount of time often elapses between the incidence of loss and the award of damages. This paper – which can be found here – seeks to address a gap in the literature by describing how major legal systems deal with interest and inflation in the context of antitrust damage claims, what the consequences are of adopting certain approaches to interest and inflation for recoverable damage amounts, and whether these approaches are economically sound. The paper is structured as follows: The first section describes the main economic approaches to address the passage of time on damages awards and for selecting an appropriate interest rate. Four main measures are identified: the…

Jens-Uwe Franck and Martin Peitz ‘Toward a coherent policy on cartel damages’ (2018) University of Manheim Discussion Paper No. 007

In short, the argument of this paper – which can be found here – is that there is an undue focus on overcharges when talking about cartel damages. The authors argue that significant losses can be suffered as a result of volume effects as well, i.e. from reduced sales / purchases as a result of the higher price that results from a competition infringement. This has implications in terms of standing, since victims of volume effects may not be allowed to bring claims for damages. This is mistaken, and standing should be granted to victims of volume effects. The argument is developed as follows: Part II outlines the law on antitrust standing in the U.S. and the E.U., as well as the basic economics of cartel damages and optimal deterrence. In the US, only direct purchasers or sellers have standing to claim antitrust damages, alongside some victims of ‘umbrella pricing’ (i.e. when non-cartelists raise their prices as a consequence of a competition infringement)….

Urszula Jaremba and Laura Lalikova  ‘Effectiveness of Private Enforcement of European Competition Law in Case of Passing-on of Overcharges: Implementation of Antitrust Damages Directive in Germany, France, and Ireland’ (sic) (2018) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 9(4) 226

The  EU Damages Directive sets out that the goal of private enforcement is compensation – claimants should be neither over- nor under-compensated, which means that the passing on of overcharges can be invoked both as a shield (for the defendant in the proceedings) and as a sword (by indirect purchasers). The authors seeks to determine whether the Directive has been correctly transposed by Member States, and assess how the Directive’s rules on passing on have affected the relative position of the parties and the role of national courts in competition damages claims in the EU. The paper, which can be found here, is structured as follows: First, the paper describes how passing on has been treated under EU law over time. In doing so, the article reviews the CJEU’s case law (mainly Courage and Manfredi) and the Commission’s work leading to the adoption of the Damages Directive. Section 2 briefly deals with the contents EU Damages Directive as regards passing on,…