Joshua P. Davis and Robert H. Lande on ‘Restoring the Legitimacy of Private Antitrust Enforcement’ in A Report to the 45th President of the United States (American Antitrust Institute’s Transition Report on Competition Policy), Chapter 6, page 219

This report, which can be found here, argues against the increasingly prevalent view that class actions are little more than legalised blackmail, and that class action lawyers are ambulance chasers rather than private attorneys general. The paper submits that there is no systematic empirical support for the view that frivolous antitrust litigation is a serious problem, and present a defence of the benefits of private antitrust enforcement. The paper is structured as follows: A first section argues that private antitrust cases are a critical component of effective antitrust enforcement. Government cannot be expected to do all or even most of the necessary competition enforcement. In addition to budgetary constraints, there are a number of reasons for this – including “undue fear of losing cases; lack of awareness of industry conditions; overly suspicious views about complaints by ‘losers’ that they were in fact victims of anticompetitive behavior; higher turnover among government attorneys; and the unfortunate, but undeniable, reality that government enforcement (or…

Sebastian Peyer ‘Private antitrust enforcement in England and Wales after the EU Damages Directives: Where are we heading?’ in Pier Luigi Parcu, Giorgio Monti & Marco Botta (eds.) Private Enforcement of EU Competition Law: the Impact of the Damages Directive (2018, Elgar)

This paper, which can be found here, provides an overview of recent developments, and offers an insight into the functioning of private enforcement of competition law in England and Wales. It is structured as follows: The first section provides an overview of the legal framework for competition damages actions in the UK. Compensation claims for the infringement of UK or EU competition law are normally based on a breach of statutory duty. Claimants have sought to establish other causes of action in competition law, but their attempts to rely on unjust enrichment (restitution) or economic (intentional) torts have been unsuccessful so far. Economic torts, such as intentionally interfering with business by unlawful means and conspiracy to injure using unlawful means, require proof of intention to injure the claimant. Courts have found that this element is absent in competition infringements, at least in follow-on claims, since the intention to make an (illegal) profit through a cartel is not the same as…

Matthijs Kuijpers, Tommi Palumbo, Elaine Whiteford and Thomas B Paul on ‘Actions for Damages in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Germany’ (2018) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 9(1) 55

This article – which can be found here –  provides an overview of private competition enforcement developments during the past year in the three EU jurisdictions where most such actions are brought. The paper is quite straightforward. Section 2 discusses the legislative developments in each of these jurisdictions, with a focus on the implementation of the EU Damages Directive and on collective redress (i.e. class actions). This section also discusses other recurring topics in follow-on damages litigation, such as the passing-on defence, access to evidence, standard of proof and limitation periods. Section 3 discusses stand-alone damages claims. It concludes that stand-alone claims are rarely successful – with the potential exception of ‘quasi-follow’ on claims, i.e. claims that reflect infringement decisions but which are not addressed to the infringing parties sanctioned by competition authorities, such as in the various instances of credit card litigation I described in previous emails. It further finds that abuse actions (i.e. complaints against powerful companies) are more common…